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Restricting Shareholder Voting Rights Under the 
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BACKGROUND OF THE UTAH REVISED 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
In 1992 the Utah Legislature repealed the Utah Business 
Corporation Act and enacted in its place the Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act ("Utah Revised Act").' The Utah 
Revised Act was drafted by the Utah Business Corporation Act 
Revision Committee ("Revision Committee"), established 
through the Business Law Section of the Utah State Bar.2 The 
Revision Committee based the Utah Revised Act on the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act ("Model Act"), which was 
adopted in 1984 by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the 
American Bar Association's Business Law Se~ t ion .~  Utah's 
Revised Act is essentially an adoption of the ABA's Model Act.4 
But the Revision Committee modified various provisions of the 
Model Act to respond to local needs and con~erns.~ One of 
these changes involves restrictions on shareholder voting. 
The Utah Revised Act, like the Model Act, permits 
corporations to create shares designated as n~nvoting,~ but 
under both the Model Act and the Utah Revised Act even 
nonvoting shares have a right to vote as separate "voting 
groups" on certain kinds of amendments.? However, Utah's 
Revision Committee included a provision in subsection 1004(5) 
of the Utah Revised Act that was not part of the ABA's Model 
Act and that does not appear in the corporations code of any 
1. H.B. 50, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UTAH LEG. REP. 45 (enacted as 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-101 to -1705 (1995)). 
2. UTAH BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT REVISION C O ~ I I T E E ,  COMMENTARY TO 
UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1 (1992) [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO
REVISED ACT]. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-601(3). 
7. Id. 9 16-10a-1004(1); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 5 10.04(a) 
(Comm. on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corp., Banking and Business Law of 
the Am. Bar Ass'n 1984). 
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other state.8 On its face, this provision seems to make it 
possible for corporations to create shares with no voting rights 
of any kind-not even the limited right to form separate voting 
 group^.^ Unfortunately, the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, and the commentary published with the statute, 
which was written for the Model Act and not modified to 
account for changes in the Utah Revised Act,'' only adds to 
the ambiguity. In fact, the commentary leaves readers with the 
impression that the legislature intended just the opposite of 
what the statute says." Nevertheless, a close examination of 
the statute indicates that Utah corporations can in fact create 
shares without any voting rights at  all, provided that the 
shareholders to whom the shares are issued have notice of the 
restrictions associated with their shares or give their approval 
for such restrictions to be imposed. 
This Comment argues that the drafters of Utah's Revised 
Act have attempted to create a means by which corporations 
may, subject to the prior notice or approval of the affected 
class, restrict shareholders from voting in even the limited 
capacity of voting groups. Unfortunately, the statute as drafted 
creates a level of ambiguity that may prevent corporations from 
taking advantage of this innovative provision. 
11. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH REVISED 
ACT AND THE MODEL ACT 
Under Utah's Revised Act, as under the ABA's Model Act, 
shareholders are classified within one or more classes of 
shares, which classes may be further subdivided into various 
"series."" These classes and series are distinguished by the 
"preferences, limitations, and relative rights"-including voting 
rights-accorded to each in the company's articles of 
incorporation. The Utah Revised Act states that "[tlhe articles 
of incorporation may authorize one or more classes of shares 
and one or more series of shares within any class that: (a) have 
special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no right to vote, 
8. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-1004(5) (Supp. 1994). 
9. See id. 
10. See discussion infia part 1II.A.l. 
11. See COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, at 106-07. 
12. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-601(1), (3) (Supp. 1994); see also REVISED 
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, supra note 7, $ 6.01(a). 
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except to the extent prohibited by this chapter."13 Thus 
articles of incorporation may designate certain shares as 
nonvoting, but this designation is subject to certain limitations. 
The official commentaries published with both the Model 
Act and the Utah Revised Act state that "[tlhis 'except' clause 
refers to the provisions in the [Utah] Revised Act that permit 
shares that are designated to be nonvoting to vote as separate 
voting groups on amendments to articles of incorporation and 
other organic changes in the corporation that directly affect 
that class (see sections 726 and 1004)."14 Unfortunately, 
sections 726 and 1004 of the Utah Revised Act are ambiguous 
about the extent to which shareholder voting rights may be 
limited. 
A. Section 1004: The Voting Group Entitlement 
Section 726 simply explains the mechanics of voting by 
"voting  group^."'^ The substantive provisions of the voting 
group entitlement are contained in section 1004, which sets 
forth the nine kinds of amendments upon which shares desig- 
nated as nonvoting may nevertheless vote as a separate voting 
group.16 Section 1004 is straightforward, and makes sense 
13. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-601(3). 
14. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  28; REVISED MODEL 
BUSMESS COW. ACT, supra note 7, 8 6.01 cmt. 3.b, at  89. 
15. See UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-726; COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra 
note 2, at  61-63. "Section 726(2) basically requires that if more than one voting 
group is entitled to vote on a matter, favorable action on a matter is taken only 
when it is voted upon favorably by each voting group, counted separately." Id. at  
61. A class or series of shareholders voting as a separate voting group is thus able 
to block an amendment to the articles of incorporation even when a majority of 
the shareholders favors it. 
16. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1). The text of this subsection reads as 
follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), the holders of the out- 
standing shares of a class are entitled to vote as a separate voting group, 
if shareholder voting is otherwise required by this chapter, on a proposed 
amendment if the amendment would: 
(a) increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of 
the class; 
(b) effect an exchange or reclassification of all or part of the shares of 
the class into shares of another class; 
(c) effect an exchange or reclassification, or create the right of ex- 
change, of all or part of the shares of another class into shares of the 
class; 
(d) change the designation, rights, preferences, or limitations of all or 
part of the shares of the class; 
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from a policy standpoint since the nine situations in which the 
section creates a separate voting group all represent potential 
amendments that would directly and adversely affect the given 
class. l7 
As the Official Comment to section 1004 explains: "The 
right to vote as a separate voting group provides a major pro- 
tection for classes or series of shares with preferential rights or 
classes or series of limited or nonvoting shares against amend- 
ments that are especially burdensome to that   lass."'^ It 
would be manifestly unfair for the board of directors or other 
unaffected shareholders to unilaterally amend the articles of 
incorporation in a way that would seriously depreciate the 
value of the nonvoting shares. Section 1004 gives nonvoting 
shareholders the power, by forming a separate voting group, to 
prevent the other shareholders from adopting such amend- 
ments. 
These general provisions, common to both the Model Act 
and the Utah Revised Act, may be summarized by saying that 
while corporations may create classes and series of shares with 
no voting rights under section 601, section 1004 guarantees 
that even these "nonvoting" shareholders have the limited right 
to form voting groups to block certain kinds of amendments 
that would directly and adversely affect the value of their 
shares.lg It is clear that under Utah law, as under the Model 
Act, shareholder voting rights may at least be limited to the 
(e) change the shares of all or part of the class into a different num- 
ber of shares of the same class; 
(f) create a new class of shares having rights or preferences with re- 
spect to distributions or to dissolution that are prior, superior, or 
substantially equal to the shares of the class; 
(g)  increase the rights, preferences, or number of authorized shares of 
any class that, after giving effect to the amendment, have rights or 
preferences with respect to distributions or to dissolution that are 
prior, superior, or substantially equal to the shares of the class; 
(h) limit or deny an existing preemptive right of all or part of the 
share of the class; or 
(i) cancel or otherwise affect rights to distributions or dividends that 
have accumulated but not yet been declared on all or part of the 
shares of the class. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. 
ACT, supra note 7, 5 6.01(a)(l)-(9). 
17. See UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i). 
18. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  107; REVISED MODEL 
BUSINESS COW. ACT, supra note 7, 5 10.04 cmt. at  275. 
19. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i) with REVISED MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 5 10.04(a)(l)-(9). 
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right to vote as a separate voting group under subsection 
1004(1), but it is not as easy to determine whether or to what 
extent Utah law permits further limitations of shareholder 
voting rights. 
B. Subsection 1004(5): An Exception to the Voting Group 
Entitlement? 
Section 1004 of the Utah Code differs in important ways 
from the analogous section of the Model Act promulgated by 
the In subsection 1004(5) the drafters of Utah's Re- 
vised Act appear to have created an exception to the voting 
group rights that would evidently permit corporations to re- 
strict shareholder voting rights even more completely than 
under the Model Act. The changes made to the Utah Revised 
Act are incomplete, however, and corporations are left uncer- 
tain as to whether the ostensible exception to the voting group 
right actually exists. 
Section 1004 of Utah's Revised Act, unlike the correspond- 
ing section of the Model Act, contains language suggesting that 
the voting group entitlement is only a qualified right: voting 
group rights are guaranteed "[elxcept as otherwise provided in 
Subsection (5)."21 Subsection (5) itself is unique to the Utah 
Code and states: 
Notwithstanding the rights granted by this section to holders 
of the outstanding shares of a class or series to vote as a 
separate voting group, the rights may be otherwise restricted 
if so provided in the original articles of incorporation, in any 
amendment thereto which created the class or series or which 
was adopted prior to  the issuance of any shares of the class or 
series, or in any amendment thereto which was authorized by 
a resolution or resolutions adopted by the affirmative vote of 
the holders of a majority of the class or series." 
This subsection appears directly to contradict subsection 
1004(4), which states that "a class or series of shares is entitled 
to the voting rights granted by this section although the arti- 
cles of incorporation provide that the shares are nonvoting 
20. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(5) with REVISED MODEL BUSI- 
NESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 8 10.04 (which has no subsection analogous to the 
Utah Revised Act's 5 1004(5)). 
21. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1), (4). 
22. Id. § 16-10a-1004(5). 
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 share^."^^ However, subsections (1) and (4), which establish 
the voting group right, describe subsection (5) as an exception 
to that right; both subsections begin with the caveat: "Except 
as otherwise provided in Subsection (5) . . . ."24 Reading these 
"except" clauses together with the language of subsection (5), 
Utah's Revised Act appears to say that shareholders may vote 
on certain types of amendments even if the articles of incor- 
poration designate the shares as nonvoting, except when the 
articles of incorporation say that they can't. This is somewhat 
baffling. 
While this conflict between subsections 1004(4) and 1004(5) 
is potentially confusing, there are really only two possible read- 
ings of the section. Either the articles of incorporation can 
restrict shareholders from voting on the nine kinds of arnend- 
ments set forth in 1004(1) or they cannot. To put i t  another 
way, subsection 1004(5) either creates an exception to the right 
to vote as a separate voting group or it leaves that right intact 
and unconditionally guaranteed. 
On the one hand, the language in subsection 1004(5) which 
states that "[nlotwithstanding the rights granted by this sec- 
tion . . . to vote as a separate voting group, [shareholder voting] 
rights may be otherwise restricted if so provided in the original 
articles of in~orporation,"~~ suggests that, while group voting 
rights are guaranteed under the nine circumstances listed in 
subsection (I), the voting rights of shareholders may be re- 
stricted in any other way. This reading would favor the per- 
sistence of an unconditional right, under the specified condi- 
tions, to vote in voting groups. 
On the other hand, subsection (5) could be treated as an 
explicit exception to the voting group entitlement set forth in 
subsection (1). This interpretation is perhaps less evident from 
the language on the face of the subsection, but reading the 
entire statute according to the principles of statutory construc- 
tion established in Utah case law suggests the existence of a 
23. Id. § 16-10a-1004(4); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra 
note 7, 5 10.04(d). 
24. Compare UTAH CODE A m .  $ 16-10a-1004(1), (4) with REVISED MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 8 10.04(a), (dl. 
25. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(5). 
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legislative intent to permit companies, subject to certain pro- 
cedural restrictions and through their articles of incorporation, 
to create classes or series of shares with no rights to vote on 
any matters, not even on the nine types of critical amendments 
set forth in 1004(1). 
A. Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent 
The first principle of statutory interpretation is to some- 
how divine the legislature's intent in enacting the law. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
This court's primary responsibility in construing legislative 
enactments is to give effect to the legislature's underlying 
intent. "In determining the legislative intent of the statute, 
'the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it 
was designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that 
purpose if it can be done consistent with its lang~age?"~ 
1. Commentary to the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
As an aid in interpreting the Utah Revised Act, the Revi- 
sion Committee, in adopting the Model Act, also adopted the 
Official Comments published with the Model Act. Of these com- 
ments, Utah's Revision Committee states the following: 
The Model Act is accompanied by Official Comments that 
were considered, approved and adopted by the [ABA] Com- 
mittee on Corporate Laws. We believe that such a commen- 
tary can be helphl to business persons and legal practitioners 
trying to understand, interpret and comply with the provi- 
sions of the [UtahJ Revised Act, and the availability of such a 
commentary was a motivating factor in enacting a corpora- 
tions code based on the Model Act. Accordingly, the commen- 
tary to the Model Act was been [sic] reproduced, revised and 
adapted for use with the [Utah] Revised Act. . . . 
This commentary is intended to provide an explanation 
of the meaning, purpose, application and historical develop- 
ment of referenced sections of the [Utah] Revised Act. It also 
26. Savage Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City 
v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 
v. Utah Ins. Gum. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977); and quoting Utah Power 
& Light v. Municipal Power Sys., 784 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1989)(quoting Johnson 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966))). 
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describes some of the substantive decisions made in the 
drafting of the [Utah] Revised Act and highlights certain 
differences between the Model Act, the [Utah] Revised Act 
and the Prior Act. The Utah legislature has endorsed the use 
of this commentary as an aid in understanding and interpret- 
ing the Wtah] Revised Act, and directed that it be published 
as a companion to the [Utah] Revised 
This suggests that the commentary would be a good source to 
examine for indications of the legislative intent behind changes 
to the Model Act. Unfortunately, an examination of the com- 
mentary to section 1004 only compounds the confusion of the 
Utah Revised Act. 
At first glance, the commentary to subsection 1004(4) 
seems to suggest an unconditional right to vote in voting 
groups, and to flatly contradict the exception language of sub- 
sections 1004(1), (4) and (5). The commentary to section 1004 of 
the Utah Revised Act states in part: 
Shares are entitled to vote as separate voting groups under 
this section even though they are designated as nonvoting 
shares in the articles of incorporation, or the articles of incor- 
poration purport to deny them entirely the right to vote on 
the proposal in question, or purport to allow other classes or 
series of shares to vote as part of the same voting 
The commentary further states: 
Section 1004(4) makes clear that the limited right to vote by 
separate voting groups provided by section 1004 may not be 
narrowed or eliminated by the articles of incorporation. Even 
if a class or series of shares is described as "nonvoting" and 
the articles purport to make that class or series nonvoting 
"for all purposes," that class or series nevertheless has the 
limited voting right provided by this section.29 
This language, which is common to both the Model Act and the 
Utah Revised Act, seems to indicate that the right to vote in 
voting groups cannot be denied, and that is undoubtedly its 
intent and effect in the Official Comments to the Model Act. 
27. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  1. 
28. Id. at  106-07; see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS COW. ACT, supra note 7, 
$ 10.04 cmt. a t  275. 
29. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  107; see also REVISED 
MODEL BUSINESS COW. ACT, supra note 7, $ 10.04 cmt. a t  276. 
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However, section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act differs from 
the Model Act in significant ways, most notably by the addition 
of subsection (5). Unfortunately, the commentary published 
with Utah's Revised Act fails to account for or even reflect 
these changes.30 In fact, the commentary to section 1004 of 
the Utah Revised Act merely reproduces the Official Comments 
to the Model Act verbatim. These comments provide a helpful 
discussion on each of the subsections (1) through (4), but quite 
naturally fail to mention anything about Utah's unique sub- 
section (5).31 
This omission suggests that the commentary published 
with Utah's Revised Act is incomplete. The failure of the com- 
mentary to explain subsection (5) seems to indicate that the 
discussion in the commentary is there simply by default, or as 
a mere vestige of the Model Act. One is forced to conclude that 
the Revision Committee simply reproduced the Official Com- 
ment &om the Model Act, and that its continuing and unal- 
tered presence in the commentary to Utah's Revised Act is the 
result of an oversight by the Revision Committee rather than 
any indication of legislative intent. If this is the case, the com- 
mentary to section 1004 can be of limited help in understand- 
ing the legislative intent behind the voting group provisions of 
that section.32 One is forced to look elsewhere for indications 
of legislative intent. 
2. Legislative history 
The legislative history of the Utah Revised Act indicates 
that it was not so much the legislature as the Utah Business 
Corporation Act Revision Co~nmittee~~ that reviewed the Mod- 
30. See COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  107. 
31. See id.; cf: REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 8 10.06 
cmt. 
32. See COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  106-07. 
33. The Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee was "established 
through the Business Law Section of the Utah State Bar, in cooperation with Rep- 
resentative Nancy Lyon and the Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office." 
COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  1. 
The Revision Committee was comprised of "private attorneys specializing in the 
business law area; in-house attorneys for several large Utah corporations, including 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Questar Corporation, and Huntsman Chemical 
Corporation; a law professor from Brigham Young University's J. Reuben Clark 
School of Law [Professor David Thomas]; House Representative Nancy Lyon; 
George Danielson of the Utah Legislative Research and General Counsel's ofice; 
and Peter Van Alstyne, Director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
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el Act and drafted this particular legislation. The Revision 
Committee made various modifications to the Model Act in 
order to "address concerns and issues raised by Committee 
members, to retain certain . . . provisions [of the former Utah 
Business Corporation Act of 19611 considered to be appropriate, 
to incorporate statutory provisions that have been proposed in 
Colorado and adopted in other states, and to respond to com- 
ments received by interested Utah companies and individu- 
a l ~ . " ~ ~  One of these modifications clearly was the addition of 
subsection (5) to section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act. 
There was no floor debate on section 1004 in either the 
Utah House of Representatives or the Utah Senate. Nor is 
there a record of any discussion of the changes to that section 
in committee. The changes to section 1004 were made by the 
Revision Committee in an early drafk of the bill, but no expla- 
nation accompanies the  alteration^.^^ Interviews with mem- 
bers of the drafting committee who worked specifically on chap- 
ter 10 of the bill revealed no pertinent documentation that 
would help with the interpretation of section 1 0 0 4 . ~ ~  
However, Dorothy Pleshe, who served on the drafting com- 
mittee that worked specifically on chapter 10, recalled that the 
Code." P. CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO PROPOSED NEW UTAH REVISED 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1 (November 5, 1991) (on file with the Utah Legis- 
lative Research and General Counsel's Office (H.B. 50, 1992)). 
34. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  1. 
35. See Draft: Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 1991, 138-40 (December 
5, 1990) (copy on file with Utah Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office 
(H.B. 50, 1992)). 
36. Members of the Revision Committee that worked specifically on Chapter 
10 of the act included Connie Holbrook of Mountain FueVQuestar, Steve Goodsell 
of Union Pacific, and Dorothy Pleshe of the law firm of Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough. Julie Matis of VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, J. Gordon 
Hansen of Parsons Behle & Latimer, and Randall Romrell of Huntsman Chemical 
worked on the related provisions of Chapter 11. 
Most of the members of the Revision Committee with whom I spoke had no 
recollection of the changes to 5 1004 or of the reasons for those changes, nor had 
they preserved any records of the change. Telephone interview with George 
Danielson, former Director, Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Coun- 
sel (July 18, 1995); telephone interview with P. Christian Anderson, Attorney, 
Holme Roberts & Owen, Chair of Utah Business Act Revision Committee, Utah 
State Bar Association (July 18, 1995); telephone interview with Connie Cannon 
Holbrook, Legal Department, Mountain FueVQuestar Corp. (July 18, 1995); tele- 
phone interview with Steven A. Goodsell, Legal Department, Union Pacific Corp. 
(July 19, 1995); telephone interview with Julie Matis, Attorney, VanCott Bagley 
Cornwall & McCarthy (August 11, 1995); telephone interview with David Thomas, 
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (July 31, 1995); telephone interview 
with Randall L. Romrell, Attorney, Huntsman Chemical Corp. (August 9, 1995). 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS 
Revision Committee had intended to give corporations a way to 
completely restrict shareholder voting rights.37 Likewise, 
Gordon Hansen, a member of the Revision Committee who 
worked on the related provisions of chapter 11, indicated that 
it was his understanding that if shareholder voting rights were 
restricted from the beginning in the original articles of incorpo- 
ration, shares could be denied the right to vote entirely, even 
on issues that directly affect them.38 
No other states have adopted provisions similar to Utah's 
subsection 1004(5), and no reported cases from any state sug- 
gest the existence of any controversy over the rights of voting 
groups that may have motivated the Revision Committee to 
include this particular modification in the Utah Revised Act.39 
The recollection of Dorothy Pleshe was that the changes to the 
Model Act were the result of discussions among the Revision 
Committee members and were motivated simply by their per- 
ception that corporations, especially small corporations and 
start-up companies, should be permitted to limit the voting 
rights of shareholders so as to give the directors more complete 
control of their ~orporations.~~ 
Ultimately, the commentary published with the Utah Re- 
vised Act is of little use in determining the legislative intent 
behind the changes to section 1004. This fact, combined with 
the lack of meaningful documentation of the legislative history 
of subsection 1004(5), makes it difficult to reconstruct any 
notion of legislative intent from extrinsic documents. Neverthe- 
less, the recollection of those who served on the Revision Com- 
mittee is that the Act was drafted with the intention of increas- 
ing corporate flexibility. Creating an exception to the voting 
group entitlements would comport with this general aim. 
37. Telephone interview with Dorothy C. Pleshe, Attorney, Callister Nebeker 
& McCullough, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee 
(August 9, 1995). 
38. Telephone interview with J. Gordon Hansen, Attorney, Parsons Behle & 
Latimer, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee (August 9, 
1995). 
39. This information is based on various (fruitless) searches of the LEXIS and 
Westlaw electronic databases. 
40. Telephone Interview with Dorothy C. Pleshe, Attorney, Callister Nebeker 
& McCullough, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee 
(August 9, 1995). 
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B. Statutory Construction: 
The Interpretation of Critical Words 
Utah cases indicate that if nothing in the legislative record 
or other history of a statute indicates the legislative intent be- 
hind its enactment, the courts will look to the "plain meaning 
of the language at issue in the ~tatute."~' Realizing perhaps 
that an attempt to find "plain meaning" within the statutory 
language of the Utah Code was unduly optimistic, the courts 
have set forth a three-step procedure to be followed in the stat- 
utory construction of critical words: 
First, terms of related code provisions should be construed in 
a harmonious fashion. . . . Second, statutory terms should be 
interpreted and applied according to their commonly accepted 
meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term results in 
an application that is either "unreasonably confused, inopera- 
ble, [lor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the 
statute." . . . Third, "[ilf there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its 
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with 
its intent and purpose. n42 
Analysis of subsection 1004 under each of these three princi- 
ples indicates that the drafters of the Utah Revised Act intend- 
ed to create an exception to the voting group rights established 
under the Model Act. 
1. Construing related provisions harmoniously 
In Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. F i n l i n ~ o n ~ ~  the 
Utah Supreme Court established that terms of related code 
provisions should be construed harmoniously.* While the 
language of section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act suggests two 
possible interpretations, neither of them is without a certain 
amount of disharmony. Nevertheless, the reading that would 
41. Savage Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990); 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)). 
42. State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Grayson 
Roper LM. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989); Morton 
Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 
1991); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)). 
43. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989). 
44. Id. at 470-71. 
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create an exception to  the voting group right is more easily rec- 
oncilable with the related code provisions. 
If one reads subsection (5) to say that voting group rights 
may be restricted in any way other than being restricted from 
voting on the nine types of amendments listed in subsection (I), 
then the right to vote as a separate voting group on the subsec- 
tion (1) amendments would be unconditionally guaranteed, 
while shareholder voting rights on other, unspecified types of 
amendments would be susceptible to an absolute limitation. 
This reading would force one to conclude that subsection 
(5) is not so much an exception to subsections (1) and (4) as a 
reiteration of them. This reading also represents no change 
from the Model Act, which also guarantees an unconditional 
voting group right with respect to the critical subsection (1) 
 amendment^.^^ If this is the correct interpretation then sub- 
section (5) is simply surplusage-a redundancy that the draft- 
ers of the Utah statute added, perhaps with the object (ironical- 
ly) of clarifying section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act. 
It may be argued that nothing could be more harmonious 
than redundancy, but statutory provisions are generally as- 
sumed to have independent meaning. Furthermore, harmony 
with one statutory term may create disharmony with others. If 
subsection 1004(5) is not an exception to subsections (1) and 
(4), then it becomes difficult to explain why the drafters of the 
Utah Revised Act added the "except" clause to subsections (1) 
and (4) of the Model Act. Those subsections state that share- 
holders may, even if designated as "nonvoting" shares, vote as 
a separate voting group on certain matters, "[elxcept as other- 
wise provided in Subsection (5)."" Under the first interpreta- 
tion of the statute, it also becomes difficult to account for the 
language in subsection (5), which states that "[n]otwith- 
standing the rights granted by this section," the right to vote in 
voting groups may be restri~ted.~? 
The second, more liberal, reading of section 1004 would 
treat subsection (5) as an explicit exception to the voting group 
entitlement set forth in subsections (1) and (4). This reading is 
in harmony with the "except as otherwise provided" language 
that precedes those two subsections. If subsection (5) is an 
45. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, $ 10.04 cmt., at 
275. 
46. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(1), (4). 
47. Id. 5 1004(5). 
1310 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
exception (stating that notwithstanding language in subseo 
tions (1) and (4), shareholders may be prevented from voting "if 
so provided in the articles of incorporation [or] any amendment 
theretod8), it appears to swallow the rule of subsection (4), 
which states that a shareholder may vote in a separate voting 
group "although the articles of incorporation provide that the 
shares are nonvoting". An exception cannot logically swallow 
the entire rule. Either the articles of incorporation can restrict 
voting group rights or they cannot. Thus, for the exception to 
make sense, it must be limited to a more narrow object than 
the general rule. 
Applying this principle to section 1004, subsection (5) must 
apply to a narrower set of circumstances than subsections (1) 
and (4) if it is to make sense as an exception to those subsec- 
tions. While such a distinction is perhaps not self-evident in 
the language of subsection (5),  it is discernable upon close ex- 
amination. Subsection (4) talks about "the articles of incorpora- 
tion,"*' and subsection (1) discusses "amendments."" These 
may be distinguished from "the original articles of incorpora- 
tion" discussed in subsection (5) or from an "amendment . . . 
which created the class or series or which was adopted prior to 
the issuance of any shares of the class or series" or an "amend- 
ment . . . which was authorized by a resolution . . . adopted by 
the afirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the class or 
This distinction suggests that even on those subsection (1) 
matters that directly and adversely affect a class or series of 
shares, shareholders may be prohibited from voting if the pro- 
hibition is documented in such a way that shareholders receive 
notice of the restrictions associated with their shares before the 
shares are purchased or issued. This may be done by establish- 
ing those restrictions in a provision of the original articles of 
incorporation drafted at the very inception of the corporation, 
or in an amendment adopted at or before the time the class of 
shares was created.52 
However, notice would be unnecessary if a majority of the 
affected class or series had itself approved the voting restric- 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 5 1004(4). 
50. Id. 5 1004(1). 
51. See id. $ 10046) (emphasis added). 
52. Id. 
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tions. Consequently, the second reading of subsection (5), con- 
sistent with this purpose, would also allow a corporation to 
restrict voting group rights in the articles of incorporation by 
"any amendment [of the articles] which was . . . adopted by the 
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the class or se- 
r i e ~ . " ~ ~  The overall effect of this reading is that as long as the 
restrictions are placed on the shares before anyone buys them, 
or are imposed with the approval of affected shareholders, the 
Utah Code permits the complete restriction of shareholder 
voting rights. 
The second reading is also supported by another "well- 
established rule[ of statutory construction" developed by the 
Utah Supreme Court,54 namely, that "specific statutory pro- 
visions take precedence over general statutory pro~isions."~~ 
Applying this rule to section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act, the 
provisions of subsection (5) pertaining to "original articles of 
incorporation" would take precedence over the general discus- 
sion of "articles of incorporation" in subsection (4). Likewise, 
the more specific provision in subsection (5), concerning an 
"amendment . . . which created the class or series or which was 
adopted prior to the issuance of any shares of the class or se- 
ries," is more specific than the provisions of subsection (1) cre- 
ating group voting rights for voting on "a proposed amend- 
ment," and would thus take precedence over them.56 
The more harmonious reading of section 1004 suggests 
that the drafters of the Utah Revised Act intended subsection 
(5) to create an exception to the voting group entitlement based 
on the principle of notice or approval. If this was in fact their 
intent, it is unfortunate that they did not make that purpose 
more clear in the language or commentary to section 1004. 
2. Applying the ordinary meaning of statutory terms 
While the arguments for characterizing subsection (5) as 
an exception to the rule established in subsections (1) and (4) 
are compelling, they might be conclusive but for the incongruity 
of the word "otherwise" in the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the 
rights granted by this section . . . to vote as a separate voting 
group, the rights may be otherwise restricted if so provided in 
53. Id. 
54. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992). 
55. Id. 
56. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(5) with id. 8 1004(4). 
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the original articles of incorporation."57 If in fact the drafkers 
wrote subsection (5) as an exception to the right to vote in 
voting groups, it would have made more sense for them to have 
written "notwithstanding the rights granted by this section . . . 
to vote as a separate voting group, the rights may nevertheless 
be restricted," or simply, "the rights may be restricted." 
The Utah Supreme Court has endorsed the "well-estab- 
lished rule of statutory construction that a statutory term 
should be interpreted and applied according to its usually ac- 
cepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term re- 
sults in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose 
of the statute."58 
"Otherwise" usually means "in a different manner" or "in 
another way."59 Interpreting subsection (5) according to the 
generally accepted meaning of "otherwise" would indicate that 
the first suggested interpretation should be applied, allowing 
complete restriction of voting rights only for amendments other 
than those set forth in subsection (1). Under this reading corpo- 
rations could not deny any shareholders their right to vote in 
voting groups on critical amendments, regardless of what the 
articles of incorporation said and regardless of whether the 
shareholders were on notice of such purported limitations be- 
fore they bought their shares. 
However, as indicated above:' such an interpretation is 
ultimately both "unreasonably confixsed" and "inoperable," if 
not "in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the stat- 
ute? Besides being unnecessary and redundant, it contra- 
dicts the language added to subsections (1) and (4) that explic- 
itly recognizes an exception to the voting group rights: "Except 
as otherwise provided in subsection (5) . . ."62 
Moreover, it is possible to construe the word "otherwise" so 
as to give the statutory language the effect of the second inter- 
pretation. While "otherwise" is primarily defined as "in a differ- 
57. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-1004(5) (emphasis added). 
58. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991) (discussing Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as a 
source for usual meanings of statutory terms). 
59. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1729 (2d ed. 1943). 
60. See supra part III.B.l. 
61. See Morton, 814 P.2d at 590. 
62. See discussion supra part III.B.l. 
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ent manner," or "in another way," it may also be defined as 
"contrarily," or more rarely, "on the other hand."63 Inserting 
this alternative definition into the Utah statute, subsection (5) 
clearly assumes the effect of an exception to the voting group 
entitlements created in subsections (1) and (4): "Notwithstand- 
ing the rights granted by this section . . . to vote as a separate 
voting group, the rights may on the other hand be restricted if 
so provided in the original articles of incorporation . . . ." This 
alternative definition of "otherwise" reinforces the understand- 
ing that subsection (5) constitutes an exception to the voting 
group entitlement set forth in subsection (I), rather than ex- 
cluding the situations described in subsection (1) from the ap- 
plication of subsection (5). 
3. Harmonizing the provision with the objectives of the entire 
act 
As a third method of interpreting critical words, the Utah 
Supreme Court has suggested that "[ilf there is doubt or uncer- 
tainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an 
act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light 
of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with its intent and p~rpose."~ 
Reading subsection (5) to permit the restriction of voting 
group rights upon condition of sufficient notice or approval 
avoids the redundancy and contradictions of the first alterna- 
tive reading and is consistent with accepted meanings of the 
statutory terms. It also comports with one of the general objec- 
tives of the Utah Revised Act, as explained in the commentary 
to section 601(3):~~ 
Section 601 authorizes the creation of new or innovative 
classes of shares without limitation or restriction. This section 
is basically enabling rather than restrictive since corporations 
often find it necessary to create new and innovative classes of 
shares for a variety of reasons, and with the disclosure of the 
terms of the new classes in the articles of incorporation that 
are a matter of public record there is no reason to restrict the 
63. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 1729. 
64. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). 
65. Section 601(3) states: "The articles of incorporation may authorize one or 
more classes of shares . . . that: (a) have special, conditional, or limited voting 
rights, or no right to vote . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-l0a-601(3). 
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power to create these classes. . . . Novel classes of shares may 
. . . be created in order to effectuate desired control relation- 
ships among the participants in the venture? 
This commentary hardly compels the reading of subsection 
1004(5) as an exception to the right to vote by voting groups, 
since the identical statement appears in the Official Comment 
to the Model Act:? and there is clearly no such exception in 
that statute.68 Nevertheless, the commentary does indicate 
that a general purpose behind both Acts is to expand possible 
ways in which a corporation may be organized. Furthermore, 
those who worked on the Revision Committee have indicated 
that the general impetus of the committee in revising the Utah 
Business Corporation Act, consistent with the tendency of the 
Model Act, was to give greater flexibility to corporations and to 
make the provisions for designating classes and series of shares 
as liberal as possible.69 
In harmony with the general policy of enabling corpora- 
tions "to create new and innovative classes of shares," and with 
the rationale that the terms of a class "are a matter of public 
record," subsection 1004(5) of the Utah Revised Act establishes 
a means for Utah corporations to create classes and series of 
shares with no voting rights at all. Of course, subsection (5) 
would be even more effective had the drafters expressed their 
intent less ambiguously. 
C. Public Policy 
The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that it might 
be willing to consider policy arguments if it can find no indica- 
tion of legislative intent through the usual means of statutory 
interpretation. "[Iln the absence of a discernible legislative 
intent concerning the specific question in issue, a choice among 
permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy de- 
te~mination."~~ While there are policy arguments on both 
66. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, at 29. 
67. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 5 6.01(d) and cmt. 
68. Id. 5 10.04 cmt. at 275-76. 
69. Telephone Interview with David K. Redd, Attorney, Kimball Parr 
Waddoups Brown & Gee, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Com- 
mittee (August 9, 1995); Telephone Interview with J. Gordon Hansen, Attorney, 
Parsons Behle & Latimer, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision 
Committee (August 9, 1995). 
70. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
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sides, the more convincing argument favors permitting an ex- 
ception to the voting group entitlement. 
On the one hand, certain problems are raised by reading 
subsection 1004(5) as an exception to the right to vote in sepa- 
rate voting groups. Allowing corporations to create classes of 
shares that cannot vote, even on amendments that directly 
affect the value of their shares, substantially weakens the 
drafters' avowed policy of providing "protection for . . . nonvot- 
ing shares against amendments that are especially burdensome 
to that class."71 It should also be noted that shareholders who 
are issued shares after restrictions are already in place-either 
through a provision in the original articles of incorporation or 
subsequent amendment to those articles-are assumed to take 
their shares with the knowledge and understanding that those 
restrictions apply to their shares. Language in the articles of 
incorporation would presumably create constructive notice of 
the limits associated with those shares. It may be argued that 
reliance on constructive notice potentially leaves room for the 
deception or abuse of unwary investors. 
On the other hand, it does not seem unreasonable to as- 
sume that purchasers of shares in a corporation will make 
themselves familiar with the terms associated with their 
shares. The commentary to the Utah Revised Act seems com- 
fortably to assume that constructive notice in the articles of 
incorporation is entirely adequate." Besides this notice of re- 
strictions, nonvoting shareholders are afforded two levels of 
protection for the nine essential interests defined in 
5 1004(l)(a) through (i). 
First, absent a provision in the articles of incorporation 
adopted in a manner prescribed by subsection (5), shareholders 
are still entitled under subsections (1) and (4) to vote as a sepa- 
rate voting group on any amendment that would affect their 
essential  interest^.?^ Second, under subsection (5), this voting 
group entitlement is itself afforded heightened protection by 
the fact that it may not be waived by an ordinary amendment, 
P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). 
71. COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, at 107; see also discussion 
supra part 1I.A. 
72. See COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, at 29 ("With the disclo- 
sure of the terms of the new classes in the articles of incorporation that are a 
matter of public record there is no reason to restrict the power to create these 
classes."). 
73. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1), (4); see supra note 15. 
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but only by an amendment approved by affirmative vote of a 
majority of the shares within the affected class or series it- 
self.?* Ordinary actions may be approved by a majority of the 
voting group members present at  the meeting, as long as a 
quorum of members is pre~ent .?~ By requiring a majority of 
all the shares within the affected class, the drafters of the 
Utah statute have imposed stricter voting requirements for the 
alienation of the voting group entitlement than for other 
amendments, even the "particularly burdensome" amendments 
set forth in section 1004(1). This rule treats abstentions and 
absentees as negative votes. The combination of these provi- 
sions aggressively protects the interests of "nonvoting" share- 
holders. 
Allowing corporations to completely restrict the voting 
rights of some shareholders gives the corporation considerably 
more freedom, while imposing only minimal burdens on the 
shareholders. So long as all interested parties are put on notice 
of the voting restrictions associated with their shares before 
they acquire them, there is no unfairness in imposing those 
burdens on their shares, and no reason to limit the types of 
classes or series that a corporation may create. Likewise, there 
is no reason why a corporation should not be able to restrict 
the voting rights of a given class when the restriction has been 
approved by "the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of 
the class or  series."76 Nevertheless, when a class of sharehold- 
ers brings an action against a corporation for denying them a 
right to vote on an amendment that "increase[d] . . . the aggre- 
gate number of authorized shares of the class,"77 thus de- 
creasing the value of shares within the class, a court looking at 
the equities of the case may be unpersuaded by the public 
policy argument for increasing corporate freedom and flexibility 
regardless of what the articles of incorporation might say. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Under Utah's Revised Business Corporation Act, as under 
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, corporations may 
74. See id. 5 16-l0a-726; COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, at 61- 
63. 
75. UTAH CODE ANN. 9 16-10a-725(3). A quorum is usually simply "a majority 
of the votes entitled to be cast." Id. 8 16-10a-725(1). 
76. See id. § 16-10a-1004(5). 
77. See id. § 1004(l)(a). 
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create classes and series of shares that are designated as non- 
voting.78 However, these shares still have the limited right to 
vote as separate voting groups on certain specific kinds of 
amendments that would directly affect their  interest^.?^ These 
limited voting rights cannot be denied to shareholders by ordi- 
nary amendments to the articles of incorporation." 
Section 1004(5), however, may allow the creation of classes 
and series of shares that lack even the limited right to vote on 
issues that directly affect the given class or series. The avail- 
able indications of legislative intent, the more consistent con- 
struction of the statute, and the more compelling consider- 
ations of public policy all suggest that corporations can create 
classes of shares under the Revised Business Corporation Act 
that are without voting rights of any kind, so long as this limi- 
tation is specifically spelled out in the original articles of in- 
corporation, an amendment that created the shares so restrict- 
ed, or any other amendment adopted before the shares of the 
class or series were first issued." In this way, anyone who 
purchases shares that are burdened by a total restriction of 
voting rights will have sufficient notice of the limitations asso- 
ciated with those shares. Likewise, restrictions on voting group 
rights may be imposed on a class or series by amendment to 
the articles of incorporation, but only if approved by a majority 
of all shareholders in the affected class or series.82 
Although the addition of subsection (5) to Utah's Revised 
Business Corporation Act is a laudable extension of the free 
agency of Utah corporations, the statute in its current form is 
unlikely to achieve the objective that the Revision Committee 
and the legislature apparently intended. Because the statute is 
written so ambiguously, and because the commentary pub- 
lished with the Utah Revised Act fails to explain how Utah's 
statutory innovation allows corporations to restrict voting 
group rights, corporations that might otherwise take advantage 
of the new statute will be rightfully hesitant to do so under the 
current law. The ambiguity of Utah's section 1004 invites dis- 
gruntled shareholders to sue the first corporation that attempts 
78. Id. $ 16-10a-601(3)(a); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 
$ 6.01(c)(l). 
79. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 1004(1). 
80. Id. $ 1004(4). 
81. Id. $ 1004(5). 
82. Id. 
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to restrict voting rights in the ways apparently authorized by 
subsection 1004(5). And while a company's right to restrict 
voting rights under 1004(5) would probably be upheld in court, 
few companies will want to go to court to vindicate such a 
right. 
If, however, a corporation should decide that it neverthe- 
less wants to create a class or series of shares with absolutely 
no voting rights, it is essential that these restrictions be plainly 
spelled out in (i) the original articles of incorporation drafted a t  
the inception of the corporation, (ii) an amendment to the arti- 
cles that is prior to or contemporaneous with the issuance of 
the affected shares, or (iii) an amendment authorized by a 
resolution adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority of the 
affected shareholders. It might also be wise to list and ex- 
plicitly deny the right to vote on each of the nine types of 
amendments set forth in subsection 1004(1), rather than simply 
relying on a statement that the class or series is nonvoting "for 
all  purpose^."^^ Even after taking these precautions a corpora- 
tion might think twice about antagonizing a "nonvoting" class 
of shares by proposing amendments particularly burdensome to 
the class and denying the class members any opportunity to 
vote on the amendment. 
The best solution to the problems associated with section 
1004 of the Utah Revised Act would be for the Utah Legisla- 
ture to resolve the ambiguities of that section by amending it. 
A simple amendment, such as striking out the word "otherwise" 
in subsection (5) or replacing it with the word "nevertheless" 
would make the meaning of the statute more clear. Any such 
amendment should be accompanied by changes to the Commen- 
tary as well. A short paragraph explaining the presence and 
import of subsection (5) would clarify the purpose of the statute 
and make it more usefiLg4 Although a legislative intent is 
83. See COMMENTARY TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t  107 (stating that 
"[elven if a class or series of shares is described as 'nonvoting' and the articles 
purport to make that class or series nonvoting 'for all purposes,' that class or se- 
ries nevertheless has the limited voting right provided by [section 10041"). 
84. This paragraph might read as follows: Subsection 1004(5) was included in 
the Revised Act and subsections (1) and (4) were amended to create an exception 
to the right described in subsections (1) and (4) of voting in separate voting 
groups. The change was made in order to permit corporations to create classes and 
series of shares with no voting rights of any kind, thus giving boards of directors 
and voting shareholders more control over their corporations. The complete restric- 
tion of shareholder voting rights contemplated by subsection (5) is permitted sub- 
ject to certain procedural safeguards designed to insure that affected shareholders 
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discernable in section 16-10a-1004, the ambiguity inherent in 
the statute in its present form creates a risk that that intent 
will be fhstrated. 
Erik G. Davis 
are given notice of the restrictions affecting their shares before they buy them, or 
approve the restrictions subsequent to purchase by an affirmative vote of the 
shareholders affected by the proposed change. 
